

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY AF/S:JDAVIDOW:S/P:MSPIEGEL:DH
APPROVED BY AF:TSEELYE
IO:GHELMAN
S/P:TLAKE
UN/A:JTEFFT
S/S-O RPERITO

-----075938 101847Z /47

O 101812Z AUG 77 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

NODIS
GEORGETOWN FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG, WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652:X-GDS-1

TAGS: RH, UK, PDEV

SUBJECT:BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: VANCE, OWEN, BOTHA
MEETING

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT
MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

TO: THE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

FROM: AF - TALCOTT W. SEELYE, ACTING

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN, AND
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA, LONDON, AUGUST 12

1. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THIS TRILATERAL MEETING

ARE TO: 1) PRESENT BOTHA WITH THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, 2) REQUEST SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE IN INFLUENCING SMITH TO ACCEPT THEM, 3) EMPHASIZE BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSALS FOR SOUTH AFRICA, AND 4) CONVEY IDEA THAT WE MAY CONTEMPLATE POSSIBLE ACTIONS AIMED AT RHODESIA WHICH WOULD HARM SOUTH AFRICAN INTERESTS,

IF WE DO NOT RECEIVE THE NECESSARY COOPERATION. PRIOR TO THE MEETING YOU WILL HAVE DETERMINED WITH OWEN PRECISELY HOW TO APPROACH BOTHA, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA.

BACKGROUND: THE TRILATERAL MEETING HAS BEEN PRECEDED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE EXPECTING THE WORST. VORSTER'S PUBLIC APPEAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BOTHA'S PRESS STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE MESSAGES THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS "FED UP" WITH OUR POLICIES FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. BOTHA WAS RELUCTANT TO TRAVEL TO LONDON TO HAVE NEW DEMANDS PLACED UPON HIS GOVERNMENT. THAT HE AGREED TO COME INDICATES SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE NOT TO FOMENT A FURTHER DETIORIATION IN RELATIONS. HOWEVER, HE WILL BE RESISTANT TO THE PROPOSALS AND ANXIOUS TO CONVINCE US TO HOLD BACK ON THEIR PRESENTATION.

BOTHA ALREADY HAS A FAIRLY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

SETTLEMENT PACKAGE CONTAINS. THE MAJOR NEW ADDITION, A UN ROLE AND PEACEKEEPING FORCE, WILL MAKE THE PLAN EVEN LESS PALATABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE WILL PREDICTABLY RAISE OBJECTIONS AND POINT TO THE CHINKS IN THE PLAN, NOTABLY THE LACK OF IRONCLAD, ENFORCEABLE POST-INDEPENDENCE GUARANTEES FOR THE WHITES. HOWEVER, IT IS MOST LIKELY THAT THE CENTRAL POINT OF BOTHA'S PRESENTATION WILL NOT BE TO ATTACK INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN, BUT TO ARGUE STRENUOUSLY AGAINST ITS PRESENTATION AT THIS TIME.

THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT:

SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVE: BOTHA WILL ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE US AND UK TO GIVE SMITH ENOUGH TIME TO HOLD HIS ELECTIONS, REESTABLISH HIS WHITE MANDATE AND BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH MUZOREWA AND/OR SITHOLE ON THE TERMS OF AN "INTERNAL SETTLEMENT". FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW, THIS WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR SEVERAL REASONS: IF IT WORKED, THE SETTLEMENT WOULD ASSURE A "MODERATE" GOVERNMENT, EXCLUSION OF THE RADICAL MILITARY FACTIONS, AND CONTINUED SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE FOR THE

WHITES; SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVES THAT NKOMO AND MUGABE WILL NEVER AGREE TO ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT; THE RHODESIAN MILITARY KEEPS SENDING SIGNALS THAT IT WILL SUPPORT A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, IMPLYING THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE THE SAME MILITARY BACKING AS THE OLD, WITH GREATER POPULAR SUPPORT.

U.S. OBJECTIVES:

WE WILL HAVE TO COUNTER BOTHA'S ASSERTION THAT AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT OFFERS HOPE FOR A LASTING PEACE FOR RHODESIA, AND TO CONVINCE HIM OF THE BENEFITS THAT WILL ACCRUE TO SOUTH AFRICA BY SUPPORTING OUR EFFORT.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- THE UK-US PROPOSALS ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO BRING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THAN ANY "INTERNAL SOLUTION" ARRANGED WITH ONLY THE NON-MILITARY NATIONALIST LEADERS.

-- THE INTERNAL SOLUTION COULD BRING AN ESCALATION OF THE EXTERNAL CONFLICT AND A SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF INTERNAL ORDER. IT COULD THUS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A MILITARY PATRIOTIC FRONT GOVERNMENT TAKING OVER.

-- THE UK AND US PROPOSE TO MAKE ALL NATIONALIST PARTIES A PART OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. WE BELIEVE THAT IF ALL ARE GIVEN SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE AND CAMPAIGN, THIS WILL APPEAL TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA. (NOTE: THE BRITISH CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL FALL APART AND THAT NKOMO WILL ACCEPT THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE AND PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS. MUGABE COULD THEN BE ISOLATED AND LOSE FRONTLINE SUPPORT. THIS MAY BE THE CASE, BUT WE SHOULD NOT IMPLY TO BOTHA THAT WE ARE ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING OR EXPECTING SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.)

-- WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT WHICH GIVES ALL PARTIES A FAIR CHANCE IN AN ELECTION WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE FRONT LINE STATES; AND THEY WILL USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ASSURE THAT THIS ELECTION IS PEACEFUL. PRESIDENT NYERERE HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT WHILE THE FRONT LINE SUPPORTS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S MILITARY EFFORT, THEY ALSO SUPPORT FREE ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES WOULD HAVE A FAIR CHANCE ONCE A
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

-- WHERE AN INTERNAL SOLUTION WOULD NOT END THE FIGHTING AMONG THE ARMIES, OUR PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE A UN-SUPERVISED CEASEFIRE, AS WELL AS THE GRADUAL DISBANDING OF ALL THE FORCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW NATIONAL ARMED FORCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO ASSURE PEACE.

-- IT IS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTEREST TO SUPPORT THIS INITIATIVE AS THE BEST WAY OF BRINGING PEACE TO RHODESIA. SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SURROUNDING BLACK STATES CANNOT MOVE AHEAD AS LONG AS THE WAR CONTINUES AND WHILE SOUTH AFRICA IS VIEWED AS THE PRINCIPAL SUPPORTER OF THE SMITH REGIME.

-- CONTINUED FIGHTING WILL, IN OUR VIEW, ULTIMATELY LEAD TO A NATIONALIST MILITARY VICTORY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT IMBUED NOT ONLY WITH HATRED FOR SOUTH AFRICA BUT A BELIEF IN THE INEVITABLE INVINCIBILITY OF WARS OF LIBERATION.

-- WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ESCALATE BEFORE IT IS RESOLVED. IT COULD INCREASINGLY INVOLVE OUTSIDE STATES, INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

-- IF THIS SETTLEMENT EFFORT FAILS WE WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH STRONG PRESSURES TO EXPAND AND TIGHTEN SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA, ACTIONS WHICH INEVITABLY WILL IMPINGE ON SOUTH AFRICA. WE DO NOT FORESEE BEING IN A POSITION TO RESIST ALL OF THESE PRESSURES.

SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION WITH BOTHA SOME ALLUSION TO THE DOMESTIC SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA AND TO NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- WE KNOW THAT MANY IN SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVE THAT

PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING APARTHEID WILL NOT BE RECOGNIZED
BY THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE UNITED STATES WILL RECOGNIZE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS.
WE CANNOT PRESUME TO DICTATE TO SOUTH AFRICA WHAT THE
PRECISE NATURE AND TIMING OF CHANGE SHOULD BE. THAT IS
FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO WORK OUT TOGETHER.

-- WE HOPE THAT THERE WILL SOON BE SOME EVENTS TO
WHICH WE CAN RESPOND -- SUCH AS THE INITIATION OF A
DIALOGUE WITH REPRESENTATIVE LEADERS OF ALL RACES ON
HOW PROGRESS CAN BE MADE, ENDING THE PASS LAWS, OR
REPEALING LAWS THAT DENY EQUAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

IT IS IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS THAT OUR RELATIONS IMPROVE.

NAMIBIA

POINTS TO BE MADE CONCERNING NAMIBIA WILL BE PROVIDED
FOLLOWING THE MEETINGS IN NEW YORK WITH SAM NUJOMA AND
THE SWAPO EXECUTIVE BOARD. (AMBASSADOR MCHENRY PLANS
TO BE IN LONDON AND COULD BRIEF YOU ON THIS SUBJECT, IF
YOU WISH. THE MEETING MAY PROVIDE YOU WITH AN OPPOR-
TUNITY TO REVIEW WITH BOTH THE NEW YORK TALKS AND
SUGGEST TO HIM WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE SOUTH AFRICANS
MIGHT TAKE TO RESPOND TO ANY CONCESSIONS MADE BY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

SWAPO.) END TEXT.

DRAFTED: AF/S:JDAVIDOW:S/P:MSPIEGEL; CLEARANCES:
IO:GHELMAN, S/P:TLAKE, UN/A:JTEFFT, S/S-O. CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 188690
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011
DRAFTED BY S/S-O:TGMARTIN:MGO

APPROVED BY S/S-O:TGMARTIN

-----083939 110308Z /61

O 110042Z AUG 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 188690

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG ONLY

FOL REPEAT STATE 188690 ACTION USDEL SECRETARY INFO USUN
LONDON GEORGETOWN WHITE HOUSE DTD 10 AUG.

QUOTE

N O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

NODIS

GEORGETOWN FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG, WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652:X-GDS-1

TAGS: RH, UK, PDEV

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: VANCE, OWEN, BOTHA
MEETING

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT
MEETING.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 188690

BEGIN TEXT:

TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: AF - TALCOTT W. SEELYE, ACTING

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN, AND
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA, LONDON, AUGUST 12

1. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THIS TRILATERAL MEETING
ARE TO: 1) PRESENT BOTHA WITH THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, 2) REQUEST SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE
IN INFLUENCING SMITH TO ACCEPT THEM, 3) EMPHASIZE
BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSALS FOR SOUTH AFRICA, AND 4)
CONVEY IDEA THAT WE MAY CONTEMPLATE POSSIBLE ACTIONS
AIMED AT RHODESIA WHICH WOULD HARM SOUTH AFRICAN INTERESTS,

IF WE DO NOT RECEIVE THE NECESSARY COOPERATION. PRIOR TO THE MEETING YOU WILL HAVE DETERMINED WITH OWEN PRECISELY HOW TO APPROACH BOTHA, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA.

BACKGROUND: THE TRILATERAL MEETING HAS BEEN PRECEDED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE EXPECTING THE WORST. VORSTER'S PUBLIC APPEAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BOTHA'S PRESS STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE MESSAGES THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS "FED UP" WITH OUR POLICIES FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. BOTHA WAS RELUCTANT TO TRAVEL TO LONDON TO HAVE NEW DEMANDS PLACED UPON HIS GOVERNMENT. THAT HE AGREED TO COME INDICATES SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE NOT TO FOMENT A FURTHER DETIORIATION IN RELATIONS. HOWEVER, HE WILL BE RESISTANT TO THE PROPOSALS AND ANXIOUS TO CONVINCE US TO HOLD BACK ON CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 188690

THEIR PRESENTATION.

BOTHA ALREADY HAS A FAIRLY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE CONTAINS. THE MAJOR NEW ADDITION, A UN ROLE AND PEACEKEEPING FORCE, WILL MAKE THE PLAN EVEN LESS PALATABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE WILL PREDICTABLY RAISE OBJECTIONS AND POINT TO THE CHINKS IN THE PLAN, NOTABLY THE LACK OF IRONCLAD, ENFORCEABLE POST-INDEPENDENCE GUARANTEES FOR THE WHITES. HOWEVER, IT IS MOST LIKELY THAT THE CENTRAL POINT OF BOTHA'S PRESENTATION WILL NOT BE TO ATTACK INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN, BUT TO ARGUE STRENUOUSLY AGAINST ITS PRESENTATION AT THIS TIME.

THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT:

SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVE: BOTHA WILL ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE US AND UK TO GIVE SMITH ENOUGH TIME TO HOLD HIS ELECTIONS, REESTABLISH HIS WHITE MANDATE AND BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH MUZOREWA AND/OR SITHOLE ON THE TERMS OF AN "INTERNAL SETTLEMENT". FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW, THIS WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR SEVERAL REASONS: IF IT WORKED, THE SETTLEMENT WOULD ASSURE A "MODERATE" GOVERNMENT, EXCLUSION OF THE RADICAL MILITARY FACTIONS, AND CONTINUED SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE FOR THE WHITES; SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVES THAT NKOMO AND MUGABE WILL NEVER AGREE TO ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT; THE RHODESIAN MILITARY KEEPS SENDING SIGNALS THAT IT WILL SUPPORT A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, IMPLYING THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE THE SAME MILITARY BACKING AS THE OLD, WITH GREATER POPULAR SUPPORT.

U.S. OBJECTIVES:

WE WILL HAVE TO COUNTER BOTHA'S ASSERTION THAT AN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 188690

INTERNAL SETTLEMENT OFFERS HOPE FOR A LASTING PEACE FOR
RHODESIA, AND TO CONVINCE HIM OF THE BENEFITS THAT WILL
ACCRUE TO SOUTH AFRICA BY SUPPORTING OUR EFFORT.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- THE UK-US PROPOSALS ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO BRING A
PEACEFUL SOLUTION THAN ANY "INTERNAL SOLUTION" ARRANGED
WITH ONLY THE NON-MILITARY NATIONALIST LEADERS.

-- THE INTERNAL SOLUTION COULD BRING AN ESCALATION OF
THE EXTERNAL CONFLICT AND A SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF
INTERNAL ORDER. IT COULD THUS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF
A MILITARY PATRIOTIC FRONT GOVERNMENT TAKING OVER.

-- THE UK AND US PROPOSE TO MAKE ALL NATIONALIST
PARTIES A PART OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. WE BELIEVE
THAT IF ALL ARE GIVEN SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE
AND CAMPAIGN, THIS WILL APPEAL TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA. (NOTE:
THE BRITISH CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT WILL FALL APART AND THAT NKOMO WILL ACCEPT THE
SETTLEMENT PACKAGE AND PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS.
MUGABE COULD THEN BE ISOLATED AND LOSE FRONTLINE SUPPORT.
THIS MAY BE THE CASE, BUT WE SHOULD NOT IMPLY TO BOTHA
THAT WE ARE ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING OR EXPECTING SUCH AN
EVENTUALITY.)

-- WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT WHICH GIVES ALL PARTIES
A FAIR CHANCE IN AN ELECTION WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE
FRONT LINE STATES; AND THEY WILL USE THEIR INFLUENCE
WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ASSURE THAT THIS ELECTION
IS PEACEFUL. PRESIDENT NYERERE HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 188690

THAT WHILE THE FRONT LINE SUPPORTS THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT'S MILITARY EFFORT, THEY ALSO SUPPORT FREE ELECTIONS
IN WHICH ALL PARTIES WOULD HAVE A FAIR CHANCE ONCE A
SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

-- WHERE AN INTERNAL SOLUTION WOULD NOT END THE FIGHTING AMONG THE ARMIES, OUR PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE A UN-SUPERVISED CEASEFIRE, AS WELL AS THE GRADUAL DISBANDING OF ALL THE FORCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW NATIONAL ARMED FORCEAM WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO ASSURE PEACE.

-- IT IS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTEREST TO SUPPORT THIS INITIATIVE AS THE BEST WAY OF BRINGING PEACE TO RHODESIA. SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SURROUNDING BLACK STATES CANNOT MOVE AHEAD AS LONG AS THE WAR CONTINUES AND WHILE SOUTH AFRICA IS VIEWED AS THE PRINCIPAL SUPPORTER OF THE SMITH REGIME.

-- CONTINUED FIGHTING WILL, IN OUR VIEW, ULTIMATELY LEAD TO A NATIONALIST MILITARY VICTORY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT IMBUED NOT ONLY WITH HATRED FOR SOUTH AFRICA BUT A BELIEF IN THE INEVITABLE INVINCIBILITY OF WARS OF LIBERATION.

-- WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ESCALATE BEFORE IT IS RESOLVED. IT COULD INCREASINGLY INVOLVE OUTSIDE STATES, INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

-- IF THIS SETTLEMENT EFFORT FAILS WE WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH STRONG PRESSURES TO EXPAND AND TIGHTEN SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA, ACTIONS WHICH INEVITABLY WILL IMPINGE ON SOUTH AFRICA. WE DO NOT FORESEE BEING IN A POSITION TO RESIST ALL OF THESE PRESSURES.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 188690

SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION WITH BOTHA SOME ALLUSION TO THE DOMESTIC SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA AND TO NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- WE KNOW THAT MANY IN SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING APARTHEID WILL NOT BE RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE UNITED STATES WILL RECOGNIZE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS. WE CANNOT PRESUME TO DICTATE TO SOUTH AFRICA WHAT THE PRECISE NATURE AND TIMING OF CHANGE SHOULD BE. THAT IS FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO WORK OUT TOGETHER.

-- WE HOPE THAT THERE WILL SOON BE SOME EVENTS TO WHICH WE CAN RESPOND -- SUCH AS THE INITIATION OF A DIALOGUE WITH REPRESENTATIVE LEADERS OF ALL RACES ON HOW PROGRESS CAN BE MADE, ENDING THE PASS LAWS, OR REPEALING LAWS THAT DENY EQUAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

IT IS IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS THAT OUR RELATIONS IMPROVE.

NAMIBIA

POINTS TO BE MADE CONCERNING NAMIBIA WILL BE PROVIDED FOLLOWING THE MEETINGS IN NEW YORK WITH SAM NUJOMA AND THE SWAPO EXECUTIVE BOARD. (AMBASSADOR MCHENRY PLANS TO BE IN LONDON AND COULD BRIEF YOU ON THIS SUBJECT, IF YOU WISH. THE MEETING MAY PROVIDE YOU WITH AN OPPOR-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 188690

TUNITY TO REVIEW WITH BOTH THE NEW YORK TALKS AND SUGGEST TO HIM WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT TAKE TO RESPOND TO ANY CONCESSIONS MADE BY SWAPO.) END TEXT.

DRAFTED: AF/S:JDAVIDOW:S/P:MSPIEGEL; CLEARANCES:
IO:GHELMAN, S/P:TLAKE, UN/A:JTEFFT, S/S-O. CHRISTOPHER

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 188690
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O D GREENLEE

APPROVED BY:S/S-O R PERITO

-----098918 111702Z /41

O 111630Z AUG 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 188690

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG ONLY

FOLWING REPEAT STATE 188690 ACTION USDEL SECRETARY

INFO USUN LONDON GEORGETOWN WHITE HOUSE DTD 10 AUG.
ACTION PARAMARIBO AUG 11

QUOTE N O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 188690 TOSEC 080268

NODIS
GEORGETOWN FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG, WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652:X-GDS-1

TAGS: RH, UK, PDEV

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: VANCE, OWEN, BOTHA
MEETING

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT
MEETING.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 188690

BEGIN TEXT:

TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: AF - TALCOTT W. SEELYE, ACTING

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN, AND
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA, LONDON, AUGUST 12

1. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THIS TRILATERAL MEETING
ARE TO: 1) PRESENT BOTHA WITH THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, 2) REQUEST SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE
IN INFLUENCING SMITH TO ACCEPT THEM, 3) EMPHASIZE
BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSALS FOR SOUTH AFRICA, AND 4)
CONVEY IDEA THAT WE MAY CONTEMPLATE POSSIBLE ACTIONS
AIMED AT RHODESIA WHICH WOULD HARM SOUTH AFRICAN INTERESTS,

IF WE DO NOT RECEIVE THE NECESSARY COOPERATION. PRIOR
TO THE MEETING YOU WILL HAVE DETERMINED WITH OWEN
PRECISELY HOW TO APPROACH BOTHA, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION
TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA.

BACKGROUND: THE TRILATERAL MEETING HAS BEEN PRECEDED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE EXPECTING THE WORST. VORSTER'S PUBLIC APPEAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BOTHA'S PRESS STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE MESSAGES THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS "FED UP" WITH OUR POLICIES FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. BOTHA WAS RELUCTANT TO TRAVEL TO LONDON TO HAVE NEW DEMANDS PLACED UPON HIS GOVERNMENT. THAT HE AGREED TO COME INDICATES SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE NOT TO FOMENT A FURTHER DETIORATION IN RELATIONS. HOWEVER, HE WILL BE RESISTANT TO THE PROPOSALS AND ANXIOUS TO CONVINCE US TO HOLD BACK ON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 188690

THEIR PRESENTATION.

BOTHA ALREADY HAS A FAIRLY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE CONTAINS. THE MAJOR NEW ADDITION, A UN ROLE AND PEACEKEEPING FORCE, WILL MAKE THE PLAN EVEN LESS PALATABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE WILL PREDICTABLY RAISE OBJECTIONS AND POINT TO THE CHINKS IN THE PLAN, NOTABLY THE LACK OF IRONCLAD, ENFORCEABLE POST-INDEPENDENCE GUARANTEES FOR THE WHITES. HOWEVER, IT IS MOST LIKELY THAT THE CENTRAL POINT OF BOTHA'S PRESENTATION WILL NOT BE TO ATTACK INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN, BUT TO ARGUE STRENUOUSLY AGAINST ITS PRESENTATION AT THIS TIME.

THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT:

SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVE: BOTHA WILL ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE US AND UK TO GIVE SMITH ENOUGH TIME TO HOLD HIS ELECTIONS, REESTABLISH HIS WHITE MANDATE AND BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH MUZOREWA AND/OR SUTHOLE ON THE TERMS OF AN "INTERNAL SETTLEMENT". FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW, THIS WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR SEVERAL REASONS: IF IT WORKED, THE SETTLEMENT WOULD ASSURE A "MODERATE" GOVERNMENT, EXCLUSION OF THE RADICAL MILITARY FACTIONS, AND CONTINUED SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE FOR THE WHITES; SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVES THAT NKOMO AND MUGABE WILL NEVER AGREE TO ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT; THE RHODESIAN MILITARY KEEPS SENDING SIGNALS THAT IT WILL SUPPORT A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, IMPLYING THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE THE SAME MILITARY BACKING AS THE OLD, WITH GREATER POPULAR SUPPORT.

U.S. OBJECTIVES:

WE WILL HAVE TO COUNTER BOTHA'S ASSERTION THAT AN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 188690

INTERNAL SETTLEMENT OFFERS HOPE FOR A LASTING PEACE FOR RHODESIA, AND TO CONVINCE HIM OF THE BENEFITS THAT WILL ACCRUE TO SOUTH AFRICA BY SUPPORTING OUR EFFORT.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- THE UK-US PROPOSALS ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO BRING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THAN ANY "INTERNAL SOLUTION" ARRANGED WITH ONLY THE NON-MILITARY NATIONALIST LEADERS.

-- THE INTERNAL SOLUTION COULD BRING AN ESCALATION OF THE EXTERNAL CONFLICT AND A SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF INTERNAL ORDER. IT COULD THUS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A MILITARY PATRIOTIC FRONT GOVERNMENT TAKING OVER.

-- THE UK AND US PROPOSE TO MAKE ALL NATIONALIST PARTIES A PART OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. WE BELIEVE THAT IF ALL ARE GIVEN SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE AND CAMPAIGN, THIS WILL APPEAL TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA. (NOTE: THE BRITISH CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL FALL APART AND THAT NKOMO WILL ACCEPT THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE AND PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS. MUGABE COULD THEN BE ISOLATED AND LOSE FRONTLINE SUPPORT. THIS MAY BE THE CASE, BUT WE SHOULD NOT IMPLY TO BOTHA THAT WE ARE ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING OR EXPECTING SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.)

-- WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT WHICH GIVES ALL PARTIES A FAIR CHANCE IN AN ELECTION WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE FRONT LINE STATES; AND THEY WILL USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ASSURE THAT THIS ELECTION IS PEACEFUL. PRESIDENT NYERERE HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 188690

THAT WHILE THE FRONT LINE SUPPORTS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S MILITARY EFFORT, THEY ALSO SUPPORT FREE ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES WOULD HAVE A FAIR CHANCE ONCE A SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

-- WHERE AN INTERNAL SOLUTION WOULD NOT END THE FIGHTING AMONG THE ARMIES, OUR PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE A UN-SUPERVISED CEASEFIRE, AS WELL AS THE GRADUAL DISBANDING OF ALL THE FORCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW NATIONAL ARMED FORCEAM WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO

ASSURE PEACE.

-- IT IS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTEREST TO SUPPORT THIS INITIATIVE AS THE BEST WAY OF BRINGING PEACE TO RHODESIA. SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SURROUNDING BLACK STATES CANNOT MOVE AHEAD AS LONG AS THE WAR CONTINUES AND WHILE SOUTH AFRICA IS VIEWED AS THE PRINCIPAL SUPPORTER OF THE SMITH REGIME.

-- CONTINUED FIGHTING WILL, IN OUR VIEW, ULTIMATELY LEAD TO A NATIONALIST MILITARY VICTORY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT IMBUED NOT ONLY WITH HATRED FOR SOUTH AFRICA BUT A BELIEF IN THE INEVITABLE INVINCIBILITY OF WARS OF LIBERATION.

-- WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ESCALATE BEFORE IT IS RESOLVED. IT COULD INCREASINGLY INVOLVE OUTSIDE STATES, INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

-- IF THIS SETTLEMENT EFFORT FAILS WE WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH STRONG PRESSURES TO EXPAND AND TIGHTEN SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA, ACTIONS WHICH INEVITABLY WILL IMPINGE ON SOUTH AFRICA. WE DO NOT FORESEE BEING IN A POSITION TO RESIST ALL OF THESE PRESSURES.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 188690

SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION WITH BOTHA SOME ALLUSION TO THE DOMESTIC SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA AND TO NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- WE KNOW THAT MANY IN SOUTH AFRICA BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING APARTHEID WILL NOT BE RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE UNITED STATES WILL RECOGNIZE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS. WE CANNOT PRESUME TO DICTATE TO SOUTH AFRICA WHAT THE PRECISE NATURE AND TIMING OF CHANGE SHOULD BE. THAT IS FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO WORK OUT TOGETHER.

-- WE HOPE THAT THERE WILL SOON BE SOME EVENTS TO WHICH WE CAN RESPOND -- SUCH AS THE INITIATION OF A DIALOGUE WITH REPRESENTATIVE LEADERS OF ALL RACES ON HOW PROGRESS CAN BE MADE, ENDING THE PASS LAWS, OR

REPEALING LAWS THAT DENY EQUAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

IT IS IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS THAT OUR RELATIONS IMPROVE.

NAMIBIA

POINTS TO BE MADE CONCERNING NAMIBIA WILL BE PROVIDED
FOLLOWING THE MEETINGS IN NEW YORK WITH SAM NUJOMA AND
THE SWAPO EXECUTIVE BOARD. (AMBASSADOR MCHENRY PLANS
TO BE IN LONDON AND COULD BRIEF YOU ON THIS SUBJECT, IF
YOU WISH. THE MEETING MAY PROVIDE YOU WITH AN OPPOR-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 188690

TUNITY TO REVIEW WITH BOTH THE NEW YORK TALKS AND
SUGGEST TO HIM WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE SOUTH AFRICANS
MIGHT TAKE TO RESPOND TO ANY CONCESSIONS MADE BY
SWAPO.) END TEXT.

DRAFTED: AF/S:JDAVIDOW:S/P:MSPIEGEL; CLEARANCES:
IO:GHELMAN, S/P:TLAKE, UN/A:JTEFFT, S/S-O. CHRISTOPHER
PQNQUOTE CHRRISTOPHER. UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, TEXT, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INTERIM GOVERNMENT, BRIEFING MATERIALS, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 10-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE188690
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: JDAVIDOW:S/P:MSPIEGEL:DH
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840072-1314
Format: TEL
From: STATE SS
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770875/aaaaclvd.tel
Line Count: 789
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: dfb3305d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1643344
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: VANCE, OWEN, BOTHA MEETING
TAGS: PDEV, RH, UK, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (BOTHA, PIETER WILLEM), (OWEN, DAVID A L)
To: SECRETARY USUN NEW YORK MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/dfb3305d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009